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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Richard W. Knight appeals from the district court’s order summarily
dismissing his post-conviction petition.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Knight on two counts of lewd conduct with a minor
and one count of sex abuse of a minor. (State’s Exhibit A.1)

During the 2012

trial, S.B., Knight’s 15-year-old grand-daughter, testified that Knight sexually
abused her numerous times over several years. (State’s Exhibit E, p.189, Ls.315; p.194, Ls.8-19; p.197, L.4 – p.224, L.11.) S.B.’s friend, 16-year-old K.B.,
testified that Knight sexually abused her when she and S.B. spent the night at
Knight’s house in August 2011. (State’s Exhibit E, p.253, L.7 – p.268, L.2.) The
state also submitted into evidence an audio recording of a confrontation phone
call between S.B. and Knight, and audio recordings of two police interviews with
Knight. (State’s Exhibit F, p.153, L.16 – p.167, L.21.)
The jury found Knight guilty on all three counts. (State’s Exhibit F, p.243,
Ls.3-14.) The district court imposed concurrent unified 20-year sentences with
10 years fixed on both of the lewd conduct charges, and a concurrent unified 15year sentence with five years fixed on the sex abuse charge. (State’s Exhibit B.)
The district court denied Knight’s subsequent I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of
1

The state attached several documents associated with Knight’s underlying
criminal proceeding to its Answer filed in response to Knight’s post-conviction
petition. (See R., p.55.) These documents are a part of the appellate record in
this case.
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sentence. (State’s Exhibit C.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Knight’s
sentences on direct appeal.

State v. Knight, Docket No. 40614, 2014

Unpublished Opinion No. 379 (Idaho App., February 19, 2014).
In May 2014, Knight filed a post-conviction petition. (R., pp.4-11.) The
district court appointed counsel to represent Knight in the proceeding.

(R.,

pp.47-48.) Appointed counsel filed an amended petition alleging three ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims. (R., pp.67-83.) Specifically, Knight alleged
that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to call Knight as a witness at
trial; (2) inadequately cross-examining several of the state’s witnesses; and (3)
failing to meet with Knight prior to the sentencing hearing. (Id.)
The district court granted the state’s motion for summary dismissal of the
post-conviction petition.

(R., pp.76-83, 168-182.)

The court concluded that

Knight failed to allege facts which, if true, demonstrated he was entitled to relief
as to any of his claims. (Id.) Knight timely appealed. (R., pp.183-186.) The
district court appointed counsel to represent Knight in his appeal (R., pp.191-193),
but the Idaho Supreme Court later granted appointed counsel’s motion to
withdraw from the case (12/7/15 Order). Knight proceeds pro se.
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ISSUES
Knight states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did [the] Judge Erroneously [Deny] Petitioner’s PostConviction Relief Petition First Claim Of Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel [sic].

2.

Did [the] Judge Erroneously [Deny] Petitioner’s PostConviction Relief Petition Second Claim Of Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel [sic].

(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state phrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Knight failed to show that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his post-conviction petition?
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ARGUMENT
Knight Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Post-Conviction Petition
A.

Introduction
Knight contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing two of

the claims in his post-conviction petition.

(See generally Appellant’s brief.)

Specifically, Knight contends that the district court erred by dismissing his claims
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call him as a witness at the trial,
and for inadequately cross-examining certain state witnesses. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.5-8.) A review of the record reveals that Knight failed to allege facts which, if
true, demonstrated he was entitled to relief as to either of these claims.
Therefore, he cannot show that the district court erred.
B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007).
C.

General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act.

I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.

A petition for post-conviction relief

initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the
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burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522,
164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550
(1983).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own
initiative, if the applicant “has not presented evidence making a prima facie case
as to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the
burden of proof.” Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).
Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction
application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary
hearing, deemed true. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190
(1975). However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s
conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001);
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
Also, because the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the
event of an evidentiary hearing, summary disposition is permissible, despite the
possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn from the facts, for the court alone
will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences. State v.
Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008). That is, the judge in a
post-conviction action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party
opposing the motion for summary disposition but rather is free to arrive at the
most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Id.
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D.

Knight Has Failed To Demonstrate He Was Entitled To Relief As To Any Of
His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must

demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by
specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of
counsel. Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903.
An attorney’s performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct is within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).
“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable ….” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988);
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).
1.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Knight’s Claim That His Trial
Counsel Was Ineffective For Advising Him Not To Testify At Trial

Knight contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call him
as a witness at the jury trial. (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6; see also R., pp.68-69.)

6

Knight’s claim fails because the allegations upon which it is based were
conclusory and not adequately supported by admissible evidence.
At the hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal, Knight’s
counsel clarified the scope of this claim – that Knight was alleging only that his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call him as a witness, not that he was
deprived of his constitutional right to testify. (Tr., p.6, L.21 – p.7, L.4.) The district
court recognized this distinction and properly analyzed the claim pursuant to
Strickland. (R., pp.173-176.)
Within the petition itself, Knight did not allege that he was prevented by his
counsel from testifying, that he expressed to his counsel a desire to testify, or that
his counsel misled him about his constitutional right to testify. (R., pp.68-69.)
Instead, Knight acknowledged that he had pretrial discussions with his counsel
about whether he should testify, and that his counsel advised him that he “should
not” testify. (R., pp.68-69, 74.) In the affidavit supporting his petition, Knight
alleged that he would have testified that he did not commit the crimes, that he
was living in Rhode Island for approximately two and one-half years between
2007 and 2009, that S.B. hit and kicked him several times over the last several
years, that he had threatened to put S.B. in juvenile detention, and that S.B. told
him that she would “do something to him” if Knight followed through on the
detention threat.

(R., p.74.)

Knight did not present any other evidence

supporting these factual assertions. (See R., pp.67-83.)
The district court properly dismissed this claim. (R., pp.173-176.) The
court recognized that Knight failed to present any admissible evidence indicating
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that his counsel’s advice that he not testify constituted deficient performance. (R.,
p.174.) Instead, without any allegations or evidence of coercion, or that counsel
actively prevented Knight from testifying, counsel’s decision to advise Knight not
to testify was instead a “virtually unchallengeable” strategic decision.

Knight

could have chosen to decline counsel’s advice and instead exercise his right to
testify.
The district court also analyzed Knight’s proffered testimony in the context
of the testimony actually elicited at trial. (R., pp.174-176.) It is clear from the trial
transcript that Knight’s counsel was aware that Knight had briefly lived in Rhode
Island during a portion of the time-frame of the sexual abuse, as alleged in the
indictment.

Knight’s counsel referenced Knight’s temporary Rhode Island

residency in a discussion about counsel’s intent to impeach S.B.’s mother.
(State’s Exhibit F, p.34, L.19 – p.36, L.22.) Additionally, S.B.’s mother testified
that Knight lived in Rhode Island while S.B.’s father was home between tours of
military duty in Iraq. (State’s Exhibit F, p.55, L.18 – p.56, L.24.) Knight’s counsel
expressly declined to attempt to utilize this evidence for alibi purposes. (State’s
Exhibit F, p.34, L.19 – p.36, L.12.) The reason for this strategic decision is clear
from the record. Even assuming the accuracy of the time-frame Knight alleges
he was in Rhode Island (sometime between 2007 and 2009), this does not
disprove the sexual abuse which was alleged to have occurred between March
2007 and August 2011. In his amended petition and supporting affidavit, Knight
does not identify any specific witness testimony which would have been
disproven or called into question by any additional testimony regarding Knight’s
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alleged residency in Rhode Island. Further, Knight’s own proffered testimony
indicates that he had contact with S.B. over the relevant period of time. (R.,
pp.74-75.)
The district court also recognized that S.B.’s “aggressive” physical conduct
towards Knight and S.B.’s potential motives for fabricating her allegations were
both explored by defense counsel in his cross-examination of state witnesses.
(R., pp.175-176; see also State’s Exhibit E, p.237, L.13 – p.238, L.15; p.242,
Ls.12-22; State’s Exhibit F, p.51, L.16 – p.52, L.14.)

Knight’s counsel also

discussed the defense theories regarding S.B.’s and K.B.’s alleged motives for
fabricating their allegations during his closing argument. (State’s Exhibit F, p.227,
L.6 – p.228, L.1.) Knight failed to make a prima facie showing that his counsel’s
strategic decision to present these defense theories to the jury through other
witnesses, as opposed to through Knight himself, was based upon inadequate
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective
evaluation. Therefore, Knight has failed to demonstrate deficient performance.
For similar reasons, Knight has also failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced
by this decision.
Because Knight failed to allege facts which, if true, would entitle him to
relief on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him not to
testify, this Court should affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of this claim.
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2.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Knight’s Claim That His Trial
Counsel Was Ineffective For Conducting Inadequate CrossExamination Of State Witnesses

Knight contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for inadequately
cross-examining certain state witnesses. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8; see also R.,
pp.69-70.) Knight’s claim fails because the allegations upon which it is based
were conclusory and not adequately supported by admissible evidence.
In his amended petition, Knight alleged that “proper” cross-examination of
S.B., S.B.’s mother, and K.B. would have revealed: Knight was across the
country and “incapable of committing the alleged crimes during most of the time
period alleged,” that S.B. and K.B. “misrepresented critical facts to the jury,” that
S.B. “previously repeatedly and without provocation attacked and caused harm”
to Knight, and that S.B. had a motive to retaliate against Knight and to fabricate
her testimony. (R., pp.69-70.) Knight did not identify specifically what facts S.B.
and K.B. allegedly “misrepresented” to the jury, or what the nature of S.B.’s
alleged motive to retaliate against Knight was in the context of this claim. (See
R., pp.67-75.)
The district court recognized the conclusory nature of this claim and
properly dismissed it. (R., pp.176-178.) As discussed above, Knight’s alleged
short-term residency in Rhode Island did not provide him an alibi for the charged
conduct. Further, Knight’s counsel engaged in significant cross-examination and
recross-examination of S.B., S.B.’s mother, and K.B., and inquired about such
matters as S.B.’s aggressive physical conduct towards Knight, S.B.’s potential
motives to retaliate against Knight, and alleged inconsistencies contained within
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the testimony of these witnesses. (State’s Exhibit E, p.231, L.16 – p.242, L.24;
p.249, L.20 – p.251, L.7; p.268, L.6 – p.277, L.5; State’s Exhibit F, p.39, L.1 –
p.41, L.2; p.45, Ls.1-18; p.50, L.7 – p.55, L.2; p.58, Ls.8-23.) Knight’s counsel
also discussed these matters in his closing argument. (State’s Exhibit F, p.224,
L.21 – p.228, L.13; p.232, Ls.15-19.)
Knight failed to make a prima facie showing that his counsel’s strategic
decisions regarding the cross-examination of state witnesses was based upon
inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable
of objective evaluation.

Therefore, he has failed to demonstrate deficient

performance. For similar reasons, Knight has also failed to demonstrate that he
was prejudiced by any deficiency.
Because Knight failed to allege facts which, if true, would entitle him to
relief on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately
cross-examine state witnesses, this Court should affirm the trial court’s summary
dismissal of this claim.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
order summarily dismissing Knight’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 6th day of April, 2016.

/s/ Mark W. Olson _________________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of April, 2016, I caused two true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
RICHARD WILLIAM KNIGHT
IDOC #105969
I.S.C.I. – MEDICAL ANNEX
P. O. BOX 14
BOISE, ID 83707

MWO/dd

/s/ Mark W. Olson _________________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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